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Online Shopping: Buy One Lose Legal Rights for Free
Laura Cicirelli*

I.

Introduction

The Internet allows consumers to purchase their favorite goods from the comfort of their
homes without setting foot inside a traditional brick-and-mortar store.1 While online consumers
enjoy the conveniences of online shopping, problems can arise involving the relatively new legal
sphere of online contracting and the issues these contracts present to online consumers.2
Although consumers obtain goods or electronic information, such as music downloads or digital
applications, from online purchases, they also lose certain legal rights by entering into retailers’
online agreements.3 State contract law governs online contracting4 and requires assent between
the online retailer and the online consumer regarding the agreement’s terms.5 Showing assent to
these terms and conditions can be difficult for online retailers who have the burden of proof in
showing that the consumer had actual or constructive knowledge of the terms.6

*

J.D. Candidate, 2016, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.S., summa cum laude, 2013, University of Scranton.
See Shelly Banjo & Drew Fitzgerald, Stores Confront New World of Reduced Shopper Traffic, WALL ST. J. (Jan.
16, 2014, 9:38PM), http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304419104579325100372435802.
2
See Advising e Bus. § 8:2 (2013) (“The Internet has not changed the basic needs for a contract—it has simply
raised new issues as to when those requirements are met.”).
3
See, e.g., Linda J. Demaine & Deborah R. Hensler, "Volunteering" to Arbitrate Through Predispute Arbitration
Clauses: The Average Consumer's Experience, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 55, 55 (2004) (discussing the potential
loss of one’s right to trial by jury through arbitration agreements).
4
See Stewart Org. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 36 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Issues of contract . . . are nearly
always governed by state law.”).
5
Van Tasell v. United Mktg. Grp., LLC, 795 F. Supp. 2d 770, 789 (N.D. Ill. 2011).
6
There is a difference between constructive knowledge and constructive notice. In cases lacking actual knowledge,
courts consider the various circumstances of a given case to see if constructive notice can be found. Courts have
used a finding of constructive notice of a browse-wrap agreement’s terms and conditions to justify a finding of
constructive knowledge in these online contracting cases. To find a particular online agreement enforceable, assent
by the parties must be determined by actual knowledge, or more commonly, the finding of such constructive
knowledge of the agreement’s terms and conditions. Id. at 790–91. ([A]bsent a showing of actual knowledge of the
terms by the webpage user, the validity of a . . . contract hinges on whether the website provided reasonable notice
of the terms of the contract.”); Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble Inc., 763 F.3d 1171, 1177 (9th Cir. 2014) (“But where, as
here, there is no evidence that the website user had actual knowledge of the agreement, the validity of the
1
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The United States Constitution,7 as well as many state constitutions,8 preserves the right
to a civil jury trial unless properly waived. As court dockets have become increasingly
populated, mandatory arbitration provisions and other alternative dispute resolution techniques
have eased the docket caseload.9 The Supreme Court has persistently upheld the enforceability
of such provisions through its broad interpretation of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).10 As a
result, many online retailers now contain arbitration provisions in their online agreements
because of the benefits they supply online retailers.11 Despite the Supreme Court’s strong stance
regarding the enforceability of such provisions,12 these provisions will not be enforced without
actual or constructive knowledge of the agreement’s terms.13 This has led many courts to
consider the presence of actual or constructive knowledge in online contracting cases, especially
in the online retailing context.14
This Comment will demonstrate how most online consumers have neither actual nor
constructive knowledge of online browse-wrap agreements’ terms. By adopting the reasoning in

browsewrap agreement turns on whether the website puts a reasonably prudent user on inquiry notice of the terms of
the contract.”).
7
U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
8
See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. I, §11; N.J. CONST. art. I, §9; CONN. CONST. art. I, §19.
9
See Mary Dunnewold, What Every Law Student Should Know, STUDENT LAWYER vol. 38 (2009), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/2011_build/dispute_resolution/what_every_law_student_sho
uld_know.authcheckdam.pdf.
10
9 U.S.C. §§116 (1925).
11
See Demaine & Hensler, supra note 3.
12
See, e.g., Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 2425 (1983) (stating that in a
contract between an Alabama contracting corporation and a hospital, “any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable
issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration whether the problem at hand is the construction of the contract
language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability”); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465
U.S. 1 (1984) (finding the FAA trumps conflicting state law); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740
(2011) (finding the FAA trumps even state laws aimed at protecting consumers from unconscionable class action
waivers).
13
Van Tasell v. United Mktg. Grp., LLC, 795 F. Supp. 2d 770, 79091 (N.D. Ill. 2011) ([A]bsent a showing of
actual knowledge of the terms by the webpage user, the validity of a . . . contract hinges on whether the website
provided reasonable notice of the terms of the contract.”).
14
See, e.g., Hines v. Overstock.com, Inc., 380 F. App’x 22 (2d Cir. 2010); In re Zappos.com, Inc., Customer Data
Sec. Breach Litig., 893 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (D. Nev. 2012); Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble Inc., 763 F.3d 1171 (9th Cir.
2014).
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Specht v. Netscape Communications Corporation,15 the leading case addressing browse-wrap
agreements, and taking into account empirical data on the tendencies of online consumers,16
courts can create bright-line rules articulating the circumstances where constructive knowledge
of an online retailer’s browse-wrap agreement exists even when actual knowledge does not.17
This Comment suggests rules that state legislatures and/or states’ highest courts can adopt in
order to create uniformity regarding online retailers’ browse-wrap agreements.
This Comment focuses on browse-wrap agreements between online retailers and
consumers. Although its analysis reaches all terms of such agreements, it may have special
resonance for agreements containing arbitration provisions; the increasing use of such provisions
and their negative effects on the naïve online consumer make it a pertinent topic for this
Comment. Part II of this Comment discusses the world of online contracting and its different
forms. Part III provides a background of arbitration and its increasing relevance due to the FAA.
Part IV introduces Specht v. Netscape and its reasoning for finding particular browse-wrap
agreements unenforceable. Part VI recommends rules of law for online retailers to follow to
assure consumers have constructive knowledge of a browse-wrap agreement’s terms and
condition, and Part VII concludes.
II.

Online Contracting

Arbitration provisions now appear not only in written contracts but also in online
contracts. To fully understand such a transition, one needs to understand the different forms of
online contracting. This section will briefly introduce online contracting and its two main forms:

15

306 F.3d 17 (2nd Cir. 2002).
See McMullen v. State, 714 So. 2d 368, 379 n.15 (Fla. 1998) (noting the “establishment of the scientific
respectability of psychology and its use and effect on the law”).
17
Without these bright-line rules of law, this leaves the determination of constructive knowledge of browse-wrap
agreements on online retailers’ webpages to be determined by the individual opinions of various judges, resulting in
inconsistent results.
16
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click-wrap and browse-wrap contracts. Although this Comment focuses only on browse-wrap
contracts, it explains click-wrap contracts for comparison purposes.
i. Click-Wrap and Browse-Wrap Contracts

Click-wrap contracts and browse-wrap contracts differ in the way a contracting party
accepts the contract’s terms. Click-wrap agreements require an online consumer to scroll
through the document containing the agreement and affirmatively indicate acceptance of its
terms in some way, usually by clicking an “I Agree” box.18 Conversely, browse-wrap
agreements do not require any affirmative conduct by the online consumer to show
acknowledgement of the agreement’s terms and conditions. Instead, a consumer’s use of the
retailer’s website and/or subsequent purchases from the website are claimed to constitute the
consumer’s acceptance of the agreement’s terms.19 The terms of the browse-wrap agreement,
usually available through hyperlinks labeled “Terms of Use” or “Terms and Conditions,”20 often
appear at the bottom of the first and perhaps subsequent pages of the retailer’s website.21

i.

Assent Under Both Types of Online Contracts

Both click-wrap and browse-wrap contracts often contain arbitration provisions that
online consumers enter into unknowingly. In the eyes of courts, the principles of contract law

18

See Ty Tasker & Daryn Pakcyk, Cyber-Surfing on the High Seas of Legalese: Law and Technology of Internet
Agreements, 18 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 79, 96 (2008).
19
See E.K.D. ex rel. Dawes v. Facebook, Inc., 885 F. Supp. 2d 894, 901 (S.D. Ill. 2012) (“Browsewrap agreements
typically ‘involve a situation where notice on a website conditions use of the site upon compliance with certain
terms or conditions, which may be included on the same page as the notice or accessible via a hyperlink.’”) (quoting
Southwest Airlines v. BoardFirst L.L.C., 2007 WL 4823761, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 12, 2007)).
20
See, e.g., EBAY, infra note 75; DELL, infra note 75.
21
Fteja v. Facebook, Inc., 841 F. Supp.2d 829, 836 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (“‘[W]ebsite terms and conditions of use are
posted on the website typically as a hyperlink at the bottom of the screen.’”) (quoting Hines v. Overstock.com, Inc.,
668 F. Supp. 2d 362, 366 (E.D.N.Y. 2009).
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still apply to online contracts.22 Under contract law, a valid contract requires a finding of mutual
assent between the parties to enter into such a contract.23 State contract law controls the inquiry
into proper assent.24 Courts assume assent to the terms of a given online agreement when they
find proper notice to the online customer of the agreement’s terms.25 The party wishing to
enforce the arbitration agreement, or any other provisions housed within a given online contract,
must show proper notice by either (1) actual knowledge of these terms and conditions by the
online consumer or (2) constructive knowledge of the terms by the consumer.26 By requiring
either actual knowledge or constructive knowledge of an online agreement’s terms, courts seek
to ensure that only those disputes that the parties agreed to arbitrate are actually arbitrated.27
Courts have been more willing to uniformly enforce arbitration provisions contained in
click-wrap agreements as opposed to those contained in browse-wrap agreements.28 This
difference evolved from the reasoning that an online consumer’s affirmative act of clicking to
enter into the click-wrap agreement demonstrates actual knowledge by the consumer of the
See Van Tasell v. United Mktg. Grp., LLC, 795 F. Supp. 2d 770, 789 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (“The making of contracts
over the internet has not fundamentally changed the principles of contract.”) (internal quotations and citation
omitted).
23
See id. (noting that there must be mutual assent for contracts on the Internet); Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of
Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 478 (1989) (“[T]he FAA does not require parties to arbitrate when they
have not agreed to do so.”).
24
See Van Tassell, 795 F. Supp. 2d at 788 (citing Carey v. Richards Bldg. Supply Co., 367 Ill.App.3d 724 (2006)).
25
See Dan Streeter, Into Contract’s Undiscovered Country: A Defense of Browse-Wrap Licenses, 39 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 1363, 1388 (2002) (noting that if ample evidence exists to find a potential licensee’s action to constitute assent,
then any contract formed by such assent should be enforced).
26
See Van Tassell, 795 F. Supp. 2d at 79091 (“[A]bsent a showing of actual knowledge of the terms by the
webpage user, the validity of a . . . contract hinges on whether the website provided reasonable notice of the terms of
the contract.”).
27
See Granite Rock Co. v. Int’l Brod. Of Teamsters, 561 U.S. 287, 299 (2010) (noting that the “[a]rbitration is
strictly a matter of consent, and thus is a way to resolve those disputes—but only those disputes—that the parties
have agreed to submit to arbitration”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Tasker & Pakcyk,
supra note 18 at 90 (noting that “[c]ontracts that exist in computerized format are not necessarily unenforceable”
unless there is a lack of assent).
28
See William J. Condron, Jr., Note, Electronic Assent to Online Contracts: Do Courts Consistently Enforce
Clickwrap Agreements?, 16 REGENT U. L. REV. 433, 446 (2003/2004) (stating that “many federal and state courts
enforce clickwrap agreements”); LLan Sys., Inc. v. Netscout Serv. Level Corp., F. Supp. 2d 328, 33839 (D. Mass.
2002) (recognizing the enforceability of a click-wrap agreement since the website’s user downloading software
“clicked on the box stating ‘I agree’”); Siedle v. Nat’l Assoc. of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 248 F. Supp. 2d 1140, 114344
(M.D. Fla. 2002) (finding a click-wrap agreement enforceable and valid).
22
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agreement’s terms.29 With such notice demonstrated by these affirmative acts, courts need not
enter into the muddied waters of determining what exactly constitutes constructive notice for
click-wrap agreements. For browse-wrap agreements, however, the finding of assent to an
agreement’s terms becomes more difficult.30 Although the assent analysis is the same for the
two different types of online contracts, in that both require actual or constructive knowledge, its
application for browse-wrap agreements turns on the idea of constructive knowledge.31
In analyzing an online consumer’s assent to a browse-wrap agreement, courts first look
for actual knowledge of the agreement’s terms. Proving actual knowledge of such terms and
conditions is near impossible for browse-wrap agreements because this would require the online
consumer, usually the party arguing the unenforceability of such a contract, to admit seeing the
terms and conditions on the retailer’s website; very few online consumers would admit to doing
so when the consumer would prefer his day in court over the decision of a neutral third-party
arbitrator. Also, given the fact that hyperlinks at the very bottom of retail webpages contain
these agreements, very few online consumers will likely have actual knowledge of these terms.

Tasker & Pakcyk, supra note 18 at 96 (“It makes perfect sense that the frequency of cases enforcing click-wrap
agreements should generally be higher, as assent is more clearly expressed by clicking on words or buttons
indicating agreement.”).
30
See Streeter, supra note 25 at 1365 (“The key feature of browse-wrap, and the source of its legal uncertainty, is
that it does not force a potential licensee to undertake an act that explicitly expresses an intent to enter into the
license, such as clicking ‘I agree.’”).
31
See Be In, Inc. v. Google Inc., 2013 WL 5568706 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 2013) (“[C]ourts will refuse to enforce
browsewrap arbitration provisions where there is a failure to allege ‘facts tending to show that a user would have
had actual or constructive knowledge of the Terms and Conditions.’”) (quoting Hines v. Overstock, Inc., 380 F.
App’x 22, 25 (2d Cir. 2010)); E.K.D. v. Facebook, Inc., 885 F. Supp. 2d 894, 901 (S.D. Ill. 2012) (“Because no
affirmative action is required by the website user to agree to the terms of a contract other than his or her use of the
website, the determination of the validity of a browsewrap contract depends on whether the user has actual or
constructive knowledge of a website's terms and conditions.”); Van Tassell 795 F. Supp. 2d at 790-91 (“Thus, absent
a showing of actual knowledge of the terms by the webpage user, the validity of a browsewrap contract hinges on
whether the website provided reasonable notice of the terms of the contract. “); Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble Inc., 763
F.3d 1171, 1177 (9th Cir. 2014) (“But where, as here, there is no evidence that the website user had actual
knowledge of the agreement, the validity of the browsewrap agreement turns on whether the website puts a
reasonably prudent user on inquiry notice of the terms of the contract.”).
29
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Although courts uniformly fail to find actual knowledge in browse-wrap cases, the decisions
pertaining to constructive knowledge are not as uniform.32 With this lack of uniformity
regarding constructive knowledge analysis, the enforceability of online retailers’ browse-wrap
agreements depends on different judges’ individual determinations. With the crux of the assent
analysis for browse-wrap agreements turning on a finding of constructive knowledge, courts
ought to have some guidance from their state legislatures or their state’s highest court to help
determine what an online retailer must do to put an online consumer on constructive knowledge
as a matter of law. Such guidance would create a uniform standard and would prevent the
enforceability of these agreements, including their encompassed arbitration provisions, from
being at the mercy of different judges’ individual discretions.

III.

Basic Principles of Arbitration and the Federal Arbitration Act

Arbitration, a form of alternative dispute resolution in which two opposing parties agree to
entrust a neutral third party to decide a dispute,33 has become increasingly utilized in many
different contracts including online contracts. This increasing use can be attributed to
arbitration’s benefits, such as its cost and time savings.34 Not only do businesses engaged in

Compare Ticketmaster L.L.C. v. RMB, 507 F. Supp.2d 1096, 1107 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (“Having determined that
Plaintiff is highly likely to succeed in showing that Defendants viewed and navigated through ticketmaster.com, the
Court further concludes that Plaintiff is highly likely to succeed in showing that Defendant received notice of the
Terms of Use and assented to them by actually using the website.”), Molnar v. 1-800-Flowers.com, Inc., 2008 WL
4772125 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2008) (“[T]here is no indication from case law that defendants will be unable as a
matter of law to show that plaintiff had notice of the Terms of Use on their website. Indeed, courts have held that a
party's use of a website may be sufficient to give rise to an inference of assent to the Terms of Use contained therein
(so called ‘browsewrap contracts’).”), E.K.D. ex rel. Dawes, 885 F. Supp. 2d at 901 (finding Facebook’s Terms of
Service (TOS) reasonably put plaintiffs on notice since the TOS “are hyperlinked on every page accessed by a
facebook.com user in underlined, blue text that contrasts with the white background of the hyperlink”) (applying
California law), and Major v. McCallister, 302 S.W.3d 227, 231 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009) (“Appellant's contention that
the website terms were so inconspicuous that a reasonably prudent internet user could not know or learn of their
existence, or assent to them without a “click,” is unconvincing.”), with cases discussed infra Part IV.
33
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 712 (9th ed. 2009).
34
Will Proyer, Alternative Dispute Resolution, 61 SMU L. REV. 519, 522 (2008) (“Arbitration became popular when
anyone with a concern that litigation was just too expensive and too inefficient, began to turn to arbitration as a
32
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arbitration benefit from this improved efficiency but they also limit their exposure to risk
because of the confidentiality that arbitration provides.35 When disputes arbitrate, neutral third
parties decide the disagreements rather than the court system, which results in a lack of public
court records. For businesses, the ability to have disputes invisible to the public provides an
immeasurable benefit.
The benefits of arbitration have led to arbitration provisions within a myriad of contracts
of adhesion.36 Consumer products, services, employment, and even medical contracts of
adhesion have all been littered with arbitration provisions.37 A 2008 empirical study revealed
that 76.9% of the consumer contracts studied contained mandatory arbitration provisions, 38 and,
as a result of the upward trend in these agreements’ use, this percentage has likely increased over
time. Within the broad category of consumer contracts, these provisions appear in contracts
covering a wide array of industries, including “auto purchase/lease, auto insurance, health
insurance, airline, auto rental, hotel, department store, Internet service, long distance telephone
service, cell phone, general credit card, airline-affiliated credit card, department store-affiliated
credit card, banking, grocery store, restaurant, and theme park,”39 just to name a few.
means of controlling litigation costs and limiting exposure.”); Charles B. Craver, The Use of Non-Judicial
Procedures to Resolve Employment Discrimination Claims, 11 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 141, 158 (2001) (“Fair
arbitral procedures can provide a more expeditious and less expensive alternative that may benefit workers more
than judicial proceedings.”).
35
Michael Satz, Mandatory Binding Arbitration: Our Legal History Demands Balanced Reform, 44 IDAHO L. REV.
19, 34 (2007) (“The limited exposure to risk and improved efficiency that arbitration provides for consumer-related
industries are the two primary benefits businesses derive by contracting for arbitration with consumers.”).
36
See Proyer, supra note 34.
37
See In re Knepp, 229 B.R. 821, 827 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1999); Allstar Homes, Inc. v. Waters, 711 So. 2d 924, 933
(1997) (Cook, J. concurring) (“The reality is that contracts containing [arbitration] provisions appear with increasing
frequency in today’s marketplace.”).
38
This empirical study looked at 26 consumer contracts and 164 non-consumer contracts. The various consumer
contracts looked at for the study were from companies listed in Fortune magazine’s top 100 annual rankings or wellknown companies within their various sectors. Some of these companies included: Cablevision, Verizon, Time
Warner, Comcast, Chase, American Express and AT&T. The results found that twenty out of the twenty-six, or
76.9%, of the consumer contracts between these businesses and their customers contained mandatory arbitration
provisions. Theodore Eisenberg et al., Arbitration’s Summer Soldiers: An Empirical Study of Arbitration Clauses in
Consumer and Nonconsumer Contracts, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 871, 98283 (2008).
39
Demaine & Hensler, supra note 3.
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Although the spread of arbitration provisions throughout different industries40 provides
individuals with arbitration’s benefits, various disadvantages accompany these benefits. This
Comment divides these disadvantages into two groups: (1) lack of information disadvantages and
(2) waiving of rights disadvantages.
Arbitration can be detrimental to some, usually consumers rather than businesses, due to
the lack of notice that the absence of court documents supplies to future or current litigants. The
absence of court records of disputes between a company and its consumers leaves future
consumers uninformed of a company’s customer disputes. An arbitrator may rule a certain way
“without explanation of [his] reasons and without a complete record of [his] proceedings.”41
With this lack of explanation and no public access to the results of prior disputes between a
retailer and its customers, future buyers lose a valuable way of assessing the quality of a
company’s business relations.
Arbitration provisions in contracts of adhesion also present a more prevalent and more
frequently discussed disadvantage: the waiving of an individual’s right to a civil jury trial.
Arbitration provisions waive an individual’s right to a civil jury trial in certain cases within the
Constitution’s Seventh Amendment and many individual state constitutions.42 When one waives
his right to a civil jury trial, he also waives all other derivative benefits of having his case heard

40

An empirical study looked at 167 different consumer industries that used arbitration provisions. The study broke
down these industries into eight broader categories: housing & home, rental services, transportation, health care,
food & entertainment, travel, financial, and other. In total, those implementing the study collected 161 different
arbitration provisions in 2001, thus finding that looking at the 167 different industries broken into eight larger subgroups, 35.4% of the industries studied arbitration provisions within their consumer contacts. Although this
percentage seems low, the information for the study was collected almost fourteen years ago. Surely this test, if
done again today, would yield very different results. Dermaine & Hensler, supra note 3 at 60, 63.
41
Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436 (1953); see also Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, 350 U.S. 198, 203
(1956) (“The nature of the tribunal where suits are tried is an important part of the parcel of rights behind a cause of
action. The change from a court of law to an arbitration panel may make a radical difference in ultimate result.”).
42
In re Knepp, 229 B.R. at 827 (“The reality that the average consumer frequently loses his/her constitutional rights
and right of access to the court when he/she buys a car, household appliance, insurance policy, receives medical
attention or gets a job rises as a putrid odor which is overwhelming to the body politic.”).
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within the courts. These benefits include time for extended discovery43 and the right to subpoena
witnesses to testify.44 Despite these rights being waived, challenges often lose under the Federal
Arbitration Act when a party claims improper waiver.45
Congress enacted the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) in 1925 to reverse any longstanding
judicial hostility toward arbitration agreements and to “place arbitration agreements upon the
same footing as other contracts.”46 Under the FAA, courts must treat arbitration provisions as
any other contractual provision and not fashion rules hostile to arbitration.47 Although the text of
the FAA remains mostly unchanged since its enactment in 1925, the same cannot be said for its
interpretation by the Supreme Court, which became vastly more expanded from the 1950s to the
present.
The Supreme Court has interpreted § 2, the “primary substantive provision”48 of the
FAA, throughout a string of cases described below. Section 2 reads:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract
evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by
arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or
transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part
thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an
existing controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or
refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract.49

43

FED. R. CIV. P. 26–37.
FED. R. CIV. P. 45.
45
See Jean R. Sternlight, Mandatory Binding Arbitration and the Demise of the Seventh Amendment Right to a Jury
Trial, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 669, 670 (2001) (“When made, such challenges have on rare occasion
succeeded.”).
46
E.E.O.C. v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 288–89 (2002) (citing Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500
U.S. 20, 24 (1991); see also AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1745 (2011) (“The FAA was
enacted in 1925 in response to widespread judicial hostility to arbitration agreements.” ).
47
H.R. REP. NO. 68–96, at 1 (1924) (“Arbitration agreements are purely matters of contract, and the effect of the bill
is simply to make the contracting party live up to his agreement. He can no longer refuse to perform his contract
when it becomes disadvantageous to him. An arbitration agreement is placed upon the same footing as other
contracts, where it belongs.”).
48
Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
49
9 U.S.C. §2 (1925).
44
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Section 2 has been broken down into two general clauses, the “command clause” and the
“savings clause.”50 The first part of § 2 grants courts the power to find arbitration provisions
enforceable in contracts described in § 2 while the savings clause allows for narrow
circumstances where courts can find arbitration provisions unenforceable.51 Through a series of
Supreme Court cases, the Court has given the command clause more power while minimizing
the savings clause.
Perhaps the FAA’s most significant expansion was the Supreme Court’s interpretation of
§ 2 in Prima Paint Corporation v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Company,52 where the Court
introduced what later became known as the doctrine of severability. With the plaintiff wishing
for the court to hear the contractual dispute between the parties and the defendant wishing to
compel arbitration, the Court found that under the FAA, “the federal court is instructed to order
arbitration to proceed once it is satisfied that ‘the making of the agreement for arbitration or the
failure to comply [with the arbitration agreement] is not in issue.’”53 Before this case, it would
have been reasonable to assume that under the savings clause, instances of duress or other
contract formation issues rendered the entire contract, including the arbitration provision,
unenforceable. The doctrine of severability announced in this case, however, established that
even when particular contract formation problems render a contract otherwise unenforceable, the
arbitration provision housed within a contract may be separated and enforced by courts.54

50

Arpan A. Sura & Robert A. DeRise, Conceptualizing Concepcion: The Continuing Viability of Arbitration
Regulations, 62 U. KAN. L. REV. 403, 41011 (2013).
51
Id.
52
388 U.S. 395 (1967).
53
Id. at 403 (quoting FAA § 4).
54
Essentially, this holding alerted lower courts and future litigants of the power inherent in the FAA. If a party
wished to void a contract on grounds of a formation defect and the contract includes an arbitration clause, courts
must send the case to arbitration unless a party alleges a contract formation issue in the inducement of the arbitration
clause itself.
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Expansion of the FAA continued in a series of cases from 1983 to 1985. The Court
expressed a newfound federal policy favoring arbitration provisions in its dictum in Moses H.
Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corporation,55 and later restated it as part of
the holding of Southland Corporation v. Keating.56 In Southland, Chief Justice Burger wrote
that the FAA trumps any state law pertaining to arbitration provisions under the Supremacy
Clause.57 Justice O’Connor in the dissent argued that the 1925 Congress intended the FAA to be
procedural in nature rather than substantive and, therefore, should not trump state law under
Erie. 58 Justice O’Connor’s view remains unrecognized to this day.59 The Court also found in
Southland that the FAA trumps all state laws, such as California’s Franchise Investment Law,
that outright prohibited the use of arbitration provisions.60
Beyond interpreting the command clause broadly, the Court has interpreted the savings
clause narrowly. It has held that the FAA preempts state laws that (1) outright prohibit
arbitration as seen in Southerland, (2) require unequal treatment of arbitration provisions and
thus creates hostility towards them,61 or (3) conflict with the FAA’s purpose.62

460 U.S., 1, 2425 (1983) (“[A]ny doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of
arbitration whether the problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver,
delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.”).
56
465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984) (“In enacting § 2 of the federal Act, Congress declared a national policy favoring arbitration
and withdrew the power of the states to require a judicial forum for the resolution of claims which the contracting
parties agreed to resolve by arbitration.”).
57
The Supreme Court relied on the Erie Doctrine to assert that in diversity jurisdiction cases, federal courts apply
their own procedural laws but state substantive laws apply. If a federal law trumps a state substantive law, then the
federal law prevails. Therefore, the FAA trumps any state law on this matter. Id.; see Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304
U.S. 64 (1938).
58
Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 21 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
59
See Sura & DeRise, supra note 50 at 411 (“Although Section 2 does not contain language expressly preempting
state or federal law to the contrary, the Supreme Court has long held the provision to have preemptive effect.”).
60
Southerland Corp., 465 U.S. at 35.
61
See Doctor’s Assoc., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 688 (1996) (holding that a Montana statute requiring
conspicuous notice for any arbitration provision within a contract is unenforceable since it conflicts with the FAA
since the state statute “solely” targeted arbitration provisions).
62
See Sura & DeRise, supra note 50 at 411.
55
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This expansion of the FAA’s power spanned throughout the 1980s63 and the 1990s64 and
continued to the Supreme Court’s 2011 case of AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion.65 In an
opinion written by Justice Scalia, the Supreme Court held that § 2 of the FAA preempts a
California state law known as the Discover Bank rule,66 which classifies “most collectivearbitration waivers in consumer contracts as unconscionable.”67 The California Supreme Court
had previously upheld the validity of this state rule68 as applied to waivers in either judicial or
arbitral fora. Also, “§ 2's saving clause preserves generally applicable contract defenses.”69
Despite these two facts, however, the Court reasoned that nothing in the FAA “suggests an intent
to preserve state-law rules that stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the FAA's
objectives.”70 The majority in Concepcion found that the Discover Bank rule constituted an
obstacle to arbitration and, as a result, was trumped by the FAA. Concepcion’s holding concerns
many consumers, especially those wishing to engage in class action lawsuits, since now the
Supreme Court’s treatment of the FAA will trump certain state laws enacted in order to protect
consumers from unconscionable class action waivers within contracts using arbitration
provisions.71

63

See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614 (holding that arbitration provisions
are still enforceable when the issue to be decided by an arbitrator involves enforcement of a federal law).
64
See, e.g., Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 681 (holding that laws specifying that arbitration provisions only must appear a
certain way within contracts or any other state law regulating the use of arbitration provisions are trumped by the
FAA; even if an arbitration provision violates an applicable state law, the provision will still be enforced under the
FAA).
65
131 S. Ct. 1740, 1740 (2011).
66
Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005).
67
Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. at 1746.
68
The California Supreme Court previously upheld the validity of this state law in Discover Bank. 113 P.3d at
1100. This law became known as the Discover Bank Rule, and it essentially made it so class-action waivers in
certain consumer contracts under certain circumstances were unconscionable under California contract law and as a
result, fell under § 2’s savings clause.
69
Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1748.
70
Id.
71
Alliance for Justice, One Year Later: The Consequences of AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, JUSTICE WATCH
(April 27, 2012, 1:04 PM), http://afjjusticewatch.blogspot.com/2012/04/one-year-later-consequences-of-at.html.
(“The Court held in Concepcion that the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”)’s favorable treatment of contractual
arbitration clauses preempts state laws aimed at protecting consumers and employees from unconscionable class
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This series of Supreme Court cases has allowed arbitration provisions to make their way
from business-to-business contracts, where the contracting parties are more accustomed to the
process, to business-to-consumer contracts.72 With the Supreme Court’s blessing, many wellknown companies placed these mandatory arbitration provisions in their consumer contracts,
including: Verizon, Sprint, DIRECTV, AT&T, Sony, Dell, Gateway, and Toshiba.73 After courts
found that contracting parties could indicate acceptance of an agreement’s terms by mere actions
rather than necessitating a signature, companies began to include arbitration provisions in their
online contracts with consumers.74 This trend quickly spread and explains why today many
popular online retailers use arbitration provisions in their online contracting, including: Amazon,
Barnes & Nobles, Netflix, Microsoft, Groupon, and eBay, and Dell.75 These provisions allow
action waivers.”); see also Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litigation in the Wake of
AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 623, 623 (2012) (stating Concepcion “broadly validat[ed]
arbitration provisions containing class action waivers”).
72
See Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is it Just?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1631, 1636 (2005) (noting
that great increase in use of binding arbitration provisions within consumer context is attributed to a series of U.S.
Supreme Court decisions).
73
PUBLIC CITIZEN, Forced Arbitration Rogues Gallery, http://www.citizen.org/forced-arbitration-rogues-gallery
(last visited Sept. 19, 2014); see also Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997) (upholding the
enforceability of an arbitration provision found within the warranty brochure included with computer purchase; thus
showing that arbitration provisions made their way into contracts for consumer goods).
74
See Caley v. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp., 428 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 2005) (“We readily conclude that no
signature is needed to satisfy the FAA’s written agreement requirement.”); Genesco, Inc. v. Kakiuchi & Co., 815
F.2d 840, 846 (2d Cir. 1987) (stating that “while the [FAA] requires a writing, it does not require that the writing be
signed by the parties”); Valero Ref., Inc. v. M/T Lauberhorn, 813 F.2d 60, 62 (5th Cir. 1987) (stating that “a party
may be bound by an agreement to arbitrate even in the absence of his signature”); Linea Navira De Cabotaje, C.A. v.
Mar Caribe De Navegacion, C.A., 169 F. Supp.2d 1341, 1346 (M.D. Fla. 2001) (“While an agreement to arbitrate
must be in writing, there is no requirement that the writing be signed.”).
75
PUBLIC CITIZEN, supra note 73. The arbitration provisions found on eBay’s and Dell’s websites are listed below
as examples of what arbitration provisions within these online contracts look like. EBay’s User Agreement contains
the following arbitration provision:
You and eBay each agree that any and all disputes or claims that have arisen or
may arise between you and eBay relating in any way to or arising out of this or
previous versions of the User Agreement, your use of or access to eBay's
Services, or any products or services sold, offered, or purchased through eBay's
Services shall be resolved exclusively through final and binding arbitration,
rather than in court, except that you may assert claims in small claims court, if
your claims qualify and so long as the matter remains in such court and
advances only on an individual (non-class, non-representative) basis. The
Federal Arbitration Act governs the interpretation and enforcement of this
Agreement to Arbitrate.
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online retailers to reap the benefits of arbitration but at the same time pose disadvantages to the
average online consumer who lacks actual knowledge of the online contract’s terms, including
the arbitration provision.

IV.

The Seminal Case of Specht76

Case law regarding online contracts in general is still sparse and rather new.77 In
particular, case law revolving around browse-wrap agreements is even newer; in fact, no court
addressed the enforceability of such agreements prior to 2000.78 The 2002 Second Circuit case
of Specht v. Netscape Communications Corporation,79 which some courts have relied upon for
guidance, ought to be followed by many other courts for its guidance in constructive knowledge
analysis.
Specht involved a class action lawsuit by a group of online users who downloaded free
software from Netscape’s website and had their personal information secretively obtained by

EBAY,

eBay User Agreement, http://pages.ebay.com/help/policies/user-agreement.html?rt=nc (last
visited Oct. 15, 2014).
Dell’s Consumer Terms of Sale provides the following agreement:
Your purchase of services is pursuant to this Agreement and any applicable
service agreement and by purchasing the service offering you are bound by
those terms including a requirement that you individually arbitrate any dispute
relating in any way to this transaction including any use of any service under
any warranty or service offering.
DELL, Consumer Terms of Sale, http://www.dell.com/learn/us/en/uscorp1/terms-of-saleconsumer?c=us&l=en&s=corp&cs=uscorp1 (last visited Sept. 19, 2014).
76
See Van Tasell v. United Mktg. Grp., LLC, 795 F. Supp. 2d 770, 791 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (describing Specht as the
“seminal browse-wrap case”).
77
See Tasker & Pakcyk, supra note 18 at 8283.
78
See Pollstar v. Gigmania, Ltd., 170 F. Supp. 2d 974, 982 (E.D. Cal. 2000) (“No reported cases have ruled on the
enforceability of a browse wrap license.”); see also Melissa Robertson, Is Assent Still A Prerequisite For Contract
Formation in Today’s E-Conomy?, 78 WASH. L. REV. 265, 266-67 (2003) (“Prior to 2000, no court had addressed
the issue.”).
79
306 F.3d 17 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
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Netscape when plaintiffs initiated the downloads.80 In the district court, defendant Netscape
moved to compel arbitration under Netscape’s browse-wrap agreement’s arbitration provision.
The browse-wrap agreement appeared via a hyperlink at the very bottom of the webpage. To
find the hyperlink at the very bottom of the webpage, plaintiffs needed to scroll past an enticing
“Download” button that plaintiffs clicked to obtain the free software.81 Had plaintiffs scrolled
and clicked on this hyperlink, they would then have seen the “License & Support Agreements”
housing the arbitration provision that Netscape wished to enforce.82
The Second Circuit denied Netscape’s motion to compel arbitration, finding that the
downloaders of the software did not assent to the terms of the browse-wrap agreement containing
the arbitration provision.83 Since the downloaders denied actual knowledge of the browsewrap’s terms, the court needed to determine whether sufficient constructive knowledge of the
terms and conditions existed. This inquiry does not consider whether a reasonably prudent
website user would have read the terms of the agreement, but rather would have noticed (either
actually or constructively) their presence at all.84 In determining constructive knowledge, the
Specht court recognized that Netscape’s online users “could not have learned of the existence of
[these] terms unless, prior to executing the download, they had scrolled down the webpage to a
screen located below the download button.”85 The Specht court found that a reasonably prudent
user would not have scrolled past an enticing “Download” button to find the hyperlink of the

80

Id.
Id. at 23.
82
“Had plaintiffs scrolled down instead of acting on defendants’ invitation to click on the ‘Download’ button, they
would have encountered the following invitation: ‘Please review and agree to the terms of the Netscape
SmartDownload software license agreement before downloading and using the software.’” Id. The whole agreement
did not appear at the bottom of this screen, but rather there is a hyperlink that then would direct a user to the page
entitled “License & Support Agreements” to read the agreement terms. Id. at 23-24. The agreement required users
of the website to read its terms and agree to the terms prior to downloading any software. Id. at 24.
83
Id. at 17.
84
Id. at 23.
85
Specht, 306 F.3d at 20.
81
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browse-wrap agreement at the bottom of Netscape’s webpage. Therefore, with a lack of either
actual or constructive notice by the website’s users, no constructive knowledge exists.86
Although the Specht court’s reasoning involved a website user downloading free
software, the case has been relied upon in situations involving online retailers and consumers.87
The Ninth Circuit recently applied Specht’s reasoning in analyzing the enforceability of an
online retailer’s browse-wrap agreement in Nguyen v. Barnes & Nobles, Inc.88 In Nguyen, the
plaintiff-consumer purchased a tablet from Barnes & Nobles’ website during a sale but later
found out that the retailer could no longer deliver the item due to excessive demand.89 The
consumer brought a putative class action against the retailer alleging deceptive business practices

See id. at 31 (“We are not persuaded that a reasonably prudent offeree in these circumstances would have known
of the existence of license terms.”); see also id. at 32 (stating that in circumstances where Internet users are urged to
download something immediately by clicking a button, “a reference to the existence of license terms on a
submerged screen is not sufficient to place consumers on inquiry or constructive notice of those terms”).
87
Three of the main cases relying on Specht involve the online retailers Overstock.com, United Marketing
Group, and Zappos.com. In Hines v. Overstock.com, the Second Circuit again addressed the issue of a browse-wrap
agreement in a case where plaintiffs brought a class action suit against Overstock.com after the online retailer tried
to charge its customers returning items a $30 “restocking” fee. 380 F. App’x 22, 23 (2d Cir. 2010). The online
retailer, much like Netscape in the Specht case, asked the court to compel arbitration due to the arbitration provision
found in the online retailer’s browse-wrap agreement housed within a hyperlink at the bottom of the webpage.
Hines v. Overstock.com, Inc., 668 F. Supp. 2d 362, 365 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) aff'd, 380 F. App’x 22 (2d Cir. 2010). The
Hines Court found that neither actual knowledge of these terms and conditions nor constructive knowledge of the
terms and conditions were present; without proper assent, the arbitration provision could not be enforced. Hines,
380 F. App’x. at 24.
In Van Tassell v. United Marketing Group, plaintiff-customers brought suit against defendants who again
have arbitration provisions housed within browse-wrap agreements found in a hyperlink at the bottom of defendants’
websites. 795 F. Supp. 2d 770, 770 (N.D. Ill. 2011). Just like in Overstock.com, the court relied on Specht in an
online shopping scenario. Id. at 793.
Finally, In re Zappos.com, Inc. provides another situation where plaintiffs wished to sue an online shoe
retailer regarding their purchases through the retailer’s website. 893 F. Supp. 2d at 1058. To avoid a class action
lawsuit, the defendant, Zappos, moved the court to compel arbitration in response to its arbitration provision housed
in the browse-wrap agreement housed within the hyperlink labeled “Terms of Use.” Id. at 1063. Since there was no
evidence of actual knowledge by the consumers of the browse-wrap’s terms, the court looked to constructive
knowledge. Id. at 1064. The hyperlink to the “Terms of Use” was located between the middle and bottom of each
page of the website, but visible only if the user scrolled down; if a consumer printed a physical copy of the
defendant’s homepage, the hyperlink would appear on the third of four pages. Id. Also, the website did not direct a
user to the hyperlink upon creating an account, making a purchase, or logging into an existing account. Id. Based on
these findings and relying on Specht, the court found that “[n]o reasonable user would have reason to click on the
Terms of Use,” and the link is “inconspicuous, buried in the middle to bottom of every Zappos.com webpage.” Id.
Therefore, once again another court relied on the Specht reasoning to find a lack of constructive knowledge for an
online retailer’s browse-wrap agreement.
88
763 F.3d 1171 (9th Cir. 2014).
89
Id. at 1173.
86
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and false advertising, but the defendant moved to compel arbitration under its browse-wrap
agreement’s arbitration provision.90 As in Specht, the Ninth Circuit in Nguyen looked to the
conspicuousness and placement of the hyperlink containing the browse-wrap agreement to
determine the existence of constructive notice and therefore constructive knowledge of the
agreement’s terms.91 The court found no constructive notice because the online retailer made the
terms of its agreement available only by hyperlink on the bottom of every webpage. Although
the link was conspicuous to those who scrolled down, the online retailer did not prompt the
consumer to continue scrolling or in any other way inform the consumer that such agreement
existed.92
Although a series of cases93 involving the enforceability of browse-wrap agreements
containing arbitration provisions have relied upon Specht, those courts have not further explored
the psychological reasoning behind Specht. In understanding why courts should adopt Specht’s
reasoning as a rule of law94 to eliminate inconsistent results surrounding what constitutes
constructive knowledge of a browse-wrap agreement’s terms, courts must not underestimate the
importance of the human psyche. Specht ought to be applied to all online retailing cases that
question the enforceability of browse-wrap agreements simply because psychological studies
support its holding.
90

Id. at 1174.
Id. at 1177.
92
Id. at 1179.
93
Specht was the first of a string of both state and federal cases addressing the enforceability of browse-wrap
agreements in consumer transactions. A preliminary draft of the Restatement of the Law Consumer Contracts
claims that “out of a total of 27 cases starting with Specht in 2002 and ending with Nguyen v. Barnes & Nobles . . .
courts enforced browsewraps in all eight cases where the website included both a prominent statement of notice and
conspicuous, accessible hyperlinks to the terms.” Restatement of the Law Consumer Contracts, Proposed Draft No.
1, §2 (October 28, 2014) (internal citation omitted). However, “in all 14 cases where the website lacked both a
prominent statement of notice and conspicuous hyperlinks to the terms, courts reused enforcement of the
brwosewrap for failure to provide sufficient notice.” Id.
94
Since the idea of assent, which is shown by either actual or constructive knowledge, is an issue of state contract
law, this Comment suggests that the highest state courts look toward Specht and adopts its reasoning and the
reasoning this Comment emphasizes. If state legislatures want to pass legislation regarding their states’ contract
laws, these legislative bodies should also consider the reasoning of Specht and this Comment for online retailers.
91
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V.

Why States Should Rely on Specht for Guidance: A Psychological Analysis95

i.

The Power of the Impulse Buy

Online retailing cases adopting the reasoning in Specht, as well as psychological studies
involving online shoppers, document that online shoppers do not scroll past enticing items for
sale in order to find a hyperlink containing the online retailer’s browse-wrap agreement. A
majority of purchases made by today’s consumers, approximately 75 to 80%, are categorized as
impulse buys.96 These impulse buys occur frequently and cost consumers large amounts of
money.97 An impulse buy occurs when a consumer has a sudden urge to buy something and acts
upon that sudden impulse.98 Although not all online shoppers visit websites with the intent to
make a purchase,99 eventually many of these consumers give in to impulse buys because of
strategies implemented by many online retailers.100 Online retailers will place sale items or

95

The field of psychology and the study of psychological studies have important implications when dealing with law
and determining the practicality of certain applications of the law. McMullen v. State, 714 So. 2d 368, 379 n.15
(Fla. 1998) (noting the “establishment of the scientific respectability of psychology and its use and effect on the
law”).
96
See Pranjal Gupta, Shopping Impulses, Online vs. Off, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 2, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/12/01/save-america-shop-at-work/shopping-impulses-online-vs-off
(finding impulse buying to be increasingly common and resulting in two thirds of all purcahses); see also Veronika
Svatošová, Motivation of Online Buyer Behavior, J. COMPETITIVENESS 14, 21 (2013) (“Experience and global
[research] show that only 20% of all purchases are planned, the remaining 80% are impulsive[.]”); see also Brad
Tuttle, Millennials Are Biggest Suckers for Selfish Impulse Buys, TIME,
http://business.time.com/2012/04/27/millennials-are-biggest-suckers-for-selfish-impulse-buys/ (last updated Apr.
27, 2012) (citing a finding by brand-research firm, the Integer Group, that Millennials, or those born between 1980
and 1995, are the most likely to engage in impulse buying).
97
According to a study conducted by Npower, an organization specializing in technological services, the average
consumer spends approximately $114, 293 in his lifetime on impulse buys. The most common items that are
impulse buys include: “food, clothing, magazines, wine, books, DVDs, shoes, trips, beer, and toiletries, home
furnishings, music, clothes for the kids, jewelry, accessories, gadgets, garden accessories, flowers, toys, and day
trips.” Mpacheco, Is impulse buying destroying your finances?, MVELOPES, http://www.mvelopes.com/is-impulsebuying-destroying-your-finances/ (last updated Sept. 3, 2013).
98
Jim Wilkins, How Proper Marketing Tactics Can Attract More Impulse Buyers, DMN3,
http://www.dmn3.com/dmn3-blog/how-proper-marketing-tactics-can-attract-more-impulse-buyers (last updated
Aug. 8, 2013) (“Impulse buying is an unplanned, spur-of-the-moment action/behavior.”).
99
For example, an individual may visit different webpages to compare prices for a given item. See Jiafeng Li,
Study: Online Shopping Behavior In The Digital Era, IACQUIRE BLOG, http://www.iacquire.com/blog/study-onlineshopping-behavior-in-the-digital-era (last updated May 10, 2013) (“39% of online shoppers strongly agree that ‘for
relatively expensive items, I’ll shop at different stores to make certain I get the best price.’”).
100
See infra Part V.ii.
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popular items on their homepages in hopes of encouraging those online browsers who have no
immediate intention of purchasing anything to give in to the powerful urge of the impulse buy.
Traditional brick-and-mortar stores are notorious for impulse sales triggered by
techniques such as strategically placing low-priced items close to checkout stations. As online
shopping increased in popularity,101 online retailers learned how to replicate the techniques used
in brick-and-mortar stores in the online context by placing particular items on homepages or
right before online checkout. The phenomenon of the impulse buy in brick-and-mortar stores
has quickly made its way to the online shopping industry due to present-day technological
advances, especially online recommendation systems.102
The concept of impulse buying on an online retailer’s page is not the only reason to
support the Specht court’s finding of no constructive notice and therefore no constructive
knowledge. “Eye tracking” studies also show that, generally, online consumers have a tendency
to pay very little attention to the bottom of a retailer’s webpage.103 Such studies use either
remote or head-mounted monitoring devices to record eye movement by a website’s viewers.104
The eye-tracking devices then compile the results to show researchers where online viewers

See Li, supra note 99 (“According to Forrester Research, the online retail sales volume for the US 2012 is $231
billion. This figure is predicted to grow continually to $370 billion in 2017. Forrester also reports that 53% of
people in the US shopped online in 2011 and it is predicted to grow to 58% in 2016[.]”); see also Tongxiao
(Catherine) Zhang et al., The Value of IT-Enabled Retailer Learning: Personalized Product Recommendations and
Customer Store Loyalty in Electronic Markets, MIS QUARTERLY 859, 860 (Dec. 2011) (noting that according to
Census Bureau of the Department of Commerce (2008), e-commerce sales in 2007 increased by 19% from previous
year to equal $136.4 billion).
102
See Dhanila Veena Parboteeah, A Model of Online Impulse Buying: An Empirical Study (August 2005)
(unpublished Ph.D dissertation, Washington State University) (on file with the Washington State University
Department of Information Systems).
103
Many marketing giants, including Nielson Norman Group, utilize these studies in order to see exactly where
online users look when viewing webpages. Many online retailers can hire these marketing companies to learn their
customers’ propensities. Based on these studies, online retailers can place important notices or items in areas with
the highest visual traffic. See Kara Pernice and Jakob Nielson, How to Conduct Eyetracking Studies, NIELSON
NORMAN GROUP (2014), available at http://www.nngroup.com/reports/how-to-conduct-eyetracking-studies/.
104
See EYETRACKING, About Us: What is Eyetracking?, http://www.eyetracking.com/About-Us/What-Is-EyeTracking (last visited Oct. 28, 2014).
101
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looked and for what period of time.105 Many of these eye-tracking studies performed using
online retailers’ webpages demonstrate the validity of the Specht court’s reasoning that online
consumers rarely find the terms of a given provision housed at the bottom of a webpage. These
studies show that online consumers focus attention on items initially listed on a retailer’s
webpage and their attentions begin to trail off as the consumers continue to scroll down.
According to these studies, web users spend eighty percent of their viewing time “above the
fold,” meaning the area of the webpage visible to viewers without needing to scroll.106 Even if
the online consumer does scroll “past the fold,” he gives this area of the website only one-fourth
the attention he gave to the area “above the fold.”107 Most browse-wrap agreements will be
housed below the fold in hidden hyperlinks where consumers’ attention spans wane.108 The
findings of both eye-tracking studies and psychological studies revealing that online consumers
do not likely scroll or even view the bottom of a webpage support Specht’s holding that browsewrap agreements at the bottom of a webpage do not provide sufficient constructive notice.
ii.

Online Recommendation Systems Increase the Likelihood of Impulse
Buys

Although impulse buys occur online without the use of product recommendation systems
(PRSs),109 the likelihood of an impulse buy occurring increases exponentially when online

105

Id.
How People Read on the Web, CENTER FOR PARENT INFORMATION AND RESOURCES (Aug. 2012),
http://www.parentcenterhub.org/repository/web-reading/; Jaan-Matti Lillevälja, 19 Things We Can Learn From
Numerous Heatmap Tests, CONVERSIONXL BLOG (Jan. 3, 2013), http://conversionxl.com/19-things-we-can-learnfrom-numerous-heatmap-tests/#; Neil Patel, 8 Powerful Takeaways from Eye Tracking Studies, QUICKSPROUT BLOG
(Apr. 16, 2014), http://www.quicksprout.com/2014/04/16/8-powerful-takeaways-from-eye-tracking-studies/.
107
Id.
108
In a personal study conducted for the purpose of this Comment, the websites of the top retailers of 2014 reported
by the National Retail Federation (www.nfr.com) were analyzed. With retailers in the categories of “Leading
Department Stores,” “Mass Merchants,” Apparel Merchants,” and “Sporting Goods Merchants,” each and every
leading retailer analyzed in these various categories had browse-wrap agreements housed at the very bottom of their
webpages; these browse-wraps were not visible without scrolling to the bottom of the webpage.
109
For example, Wal-Mart and Target have offered “deals of the day” to entice their online shoppers into impulse
purchases. With these deals offered as soon as an online shopper enters the website, this is enticing the customer to
click the item and purchase right away. The online retailers do not show these items to particular shoppers because
106
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retailers use such systems. 110 The increase of impulse buys from the use of online PRSs comes
from the fact that, as the ease of buying increases, so too does the likelihood of an impulse
buy.111 An online retailer can now use technology to its advantage by highlighting an item the
consumer has shown an interest in and thereby creating an easier buying situation for that
consumer, who now just needs to click to purchase an item rather than navigate through a
retailer’s website.112
These recommendation systems work by studying saved and aggregated historical data of
an individual consumer based on his prior visits to the retailer’s website, including prior
purchases and previously viewed products.113 These systems then employ algorithms using this
collected data to determine an individual’s potential interests by comparing her prior activity to
other visitors of the retail website with similar tastes.114 The product recommendations will
appear on a shopper’s sidebars or anywhere else in plain view for the consumer. Some online
retailers, such as Pottery Barn, take these recommendation systems one step further by e-mailing
recommendations to consumers.115 By simply clicking on the e-mailed image of the product sent
to him by the online retailer, the consumer will be directed to the retailer’s webpage where he
of their prior purchase or browsing history, but these are just daily deals analogous to the sale items many brick-andmortar stores place close to the registers. Krystina Gustafson, The holy grail of online: Getting you to spend more,
CNBC (Mar. 6, 2014, 11:03 AM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/101461802.
110
Gupta, supra note 96 (noting that these “various online product suggestion tools . . . may create more impulse
sales”); see Wen-Yu Tsao, The fitness of product information: Evidence from online recommendations, INT’L J.
INFO. MGMT. 1, 1 (2013) (noting that one main reason for online retailers to use these recommendation systems is to
influence a customer’s purchasing behavior and essentially trying to cause impulse buys).
111
Parboteeah, supra note 102, at 39 (noting the “positive relationship between the ease of buying and impulse
buying”).
112
See Parboteeah, supra note 102, at 40 (“Personalization is another aspect of a website that enhances online
purchasing, whereby each visitor is considered as an individual and the website content is tailored to the needs and
preferences of the individual.”).
113
See Daniel Baier & Eva Stüber, Acceptance of recommendations to buy in online retailing, J. RETAILING AND
CONSUMER SERVICES 173, 174 (2010) (“Recommender systems use the consumer’s saved and aggregated historical
data to provide recommendations; they register the latest navigation and consumer behavior and consider additional
information, or rather, they generate various combinations from suitable data sources.”).
114
See Susan Gregory Thomas, Getting to Know You.com, EBSCOHOST (1999),
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=a9h&AN=2447180&site=ehost-live&scope=site.
115
Gustafson, supra note 109 (“Stores like Pottery Barn send recommendations based on past purchases and
encourage shoppers to pull the trigger on abandoned digital shopping carts.”).
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can immediately purchase the item.116 PRSs are just one of the many different personalization
tools that online retailers use to increase the likelihood of impulse buys.117
Many online retailers, including SkyMall,118 Bluefly,119 and eBay,120 followed the
pioneer of recommendation systems, Amazon,121 to make these recommendation systems
“quietly ubiquitous” by 2010. 122 As the use of the recommendation systems increased, so too
did online retailers’ sales. In 2012 Amazon reported that a 29% sale increase during its second
fiscal quarter could be attributed to the company’s use of recommendation systems that prompt
consumers to make purchases they did not originally intend on making.123
Now online retailers can not only place popular items in front of their visitors, but can
also place items with high likelihoods of being purchased by a given visitor in front of that
person in particular.124 Due to the natural human tendency to impulse buy and the increased use
of PRSs, an online retailer’s display of products for an online consumer to click and purchase is
equally as enticing as the “Download” button in Specht which encouraged Netscape’s visitors to
click to download free software. By clicking in both situations, the online user enters into a
116

See Gustafson, supra note 109.
Even within the broad category of product recommendation systems, there are different types of recommendation
systems. One of the more popular systems, for example, is collaborate filtering, which “works on the principle that
the behavior of a lot of people can be used to make educated guesses about the behavior of a single individual.”
Thomas, supra note 114.
118
Thomas, supra note 114.
119
Id.
120
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browse-wrap agreement, most likely including a mandatory arbitration provision, without having
any reason to scroll down to the bottom of the webpage.125 As a rule of law, courts ought to find
constructive knowledge lacking in these online retailing situations. Adopting the Second
Circuit’s reasoning in Specht, there is no constructive knowledge since no reasonable online
consumer would scroll past an enticing items for sale in order to find a hyperlink hidden at the
bottom of a webpage.
VI.

Suggestions for Online Retailers

The need to create rules of law for what constitutes constructive knowledge for browsewrap agreements, especially those including arbitration provisions, has never been more
important. First, online shopping has steadily increased over time and sales have been projected
to reach $370 billion by 2017.126 Second, the use of arbitration provisions within these browsewrap agreements by online retailers has also increased,127 leaving naïve consumers to experience
the disadvantages of mandatory arbitration.128 Although online retailers’ browse-wrap
agreements contain many provisions other than arbitration provisions, the prevalence of
arbitration provisions, and the negative consequences associated with taking a consumer’s claim
out of the court system requires prompt action by the courts.

Clicking on a product while online shopping merely places the item in a customer’s virtual shopping cart.
However, in completing the purchase, the online consumer again clicks an enticing “Checkout” button without
having to scroll down to the bottom of a webpage where the hyperlink housing the browse-wrap agreement is
located. This “Checkout” button again becomes analogous to the “Download” button in Specht. In a study
conducted for purposes of this Comment, again using the top retailers of 2014 listed by the National Retail
Federation, out of the same group of retailers studied for purposes of supra note 108, none mentioned its terms and
conditions in an area above the “Checkout” button. The only hyperlink of terms that some retailers, such as Ralph
Lauren and Sports Authority, placed above the “Checkout” button as to place customers on constructive notice were
for the websites’ privacy policies.
126
See discussion supra note 101.
127
See discussion supra note 74.
128
See discussion supra Part II.i.
125

25

This Comment first suggests a rule of law declaring browse-wrap agreements housed
within hyperlinks at the bottom of online retailers’ webpages, below enticing products for
consumers to click, unenforceable. The reasonable online consumer, triggered by a compulsion
to impulse buy, would fail to scroll to the bottom of the webpage to put himself on notice. Next,
this Comment makes suggestions regarding what online retailers can do to render their browsewrap agreements enforceable. These suggestions consider both an online retailer’s desire to
make sales without scaring off potential consumers with click-wrap agreements and the
importance of providing customers with sufficient constructive knowledge.
Other legal scholars have made different suggestions regarding how courts should treat
browse-wrap agreements.129 With legal scholars making different suggestions and without clear
guidance from state supreme courts, attorneys remain baffled over how to advise clients on this
topic.130 The most common suggestions from legal scholars encompass two extreme and
opposite approaches: (1) courts should enforce only click-wrap agreements131 or (2) courts
should enforce all browse-warp agreements even if hidden at the bottom of the webpage.132
When applied to the online retailing industry, these two approaches have flaws that can only be
ameliorated by a middle-ground approach.
If online retailers relied on only click-wrap agreements where consumers need to
affirmatively check a box or click an “Agree” button prior to entering a retailer’s webpage,
consumers would likely become frustrated. Even if this simple affirmative act takes merely
129
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seconds to perform, consumers could also become weary of an online retailer’s policies if the
retailer used click-wrap agreement. Click-wrap agreements, an unorthodox contracting method
for online retailers,133 could lead consumers to take their business elsewhere.134 Click-wrap
agreements can create a lack of trust between the consumer and the online retailer, and a lack of
trust negatively affects online sales revenue.135 By studying over thirty of 2014’s top online
retailers as reported by the National Retail Federation, none of the online retailers used clickwraps but rather relied on browse-wrap contracts.136 As a result, many online retailers would
surely prefer browse-wrap agreements to click-wrap agreements for this reason and perhaps
would lobby against any state law requiring the use of click-wrap agreements.137
Similarly, an approach finding all browse-wrap agreements enforceable would be easier
to apply than a middle-ground approach, but unjust for online consumers. As suggested
throughout this Comment, browse-wrap agreements hidden at the bottom of a retailer’s webpage
do not put a reasonable consumer on notice of the agreement’s terms. While online retailers
would push for legislation implementing this theory, many consumers would be troubled by such
an act.
Both online retailers and consumers would support a middle-ground approach, and as a
result, it must be implemented. State legislatures and courts must also comply with the FAA138
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as well as the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.)139 in determining an approach for dealing
with online browse-wrap agreements containing arbitration provisions. All states except
Louisiana and the District of Columbia140 have adopted the U.C.C., including Article 2, which
governs the sale of “goods.”141 Although individual states have adopted the U.C.C. with
variations by their state legislatures, these variations are minor and “the similarities of all states’
U.C.C[.] provisions . . . far outweigh the differences.”142 Since online retailers sell movable
goods, among other things, the U.C.C. would apply to such transactions. States must be sure to
abide by the provisions of the U.C.C. when considering rules of law pertaining to online
retailers’ browse-wrap agreements.143
The middle-ground approach this Comment suggests recommends two techniques online
retailers can implement so that courts find constructive knowledge and therefore enforce the
retailers’ browse-wrap agreements. First, online retailers could place their “Terms and
Conditions” hyperlink across the top of their websites rather than at the very bottom of their
websites. Online consumers read from top to bottom, so following the website’s homepage from
top to bottom, the customer would presumably come across this hyperlink before being
persuaded to click on the enticing items for sale.144 This recommendation avoids the problems
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noted in Specht and highlighted through the psychological and eye-tracking studies noting that
no reasonable consumer would scroll past enticing items in order to find the hyperlink at the
bottom of a webpage. Under this technique, there is no scrolling required to see the hyperlink
containing the browse-wrap agreement and, because reasonable consumers read from top to
bottom, they would have an opportunity to see the hyperlink prior to both placing the item within
their shopping carts and checking out.
The second recommendation of this middle-ground approach suggests that retailers place
the hyperlinks to these terms of the agreements above the “Complete Purchase” button on their
webpages.145 Again, keeping in mind a consumer’s tendency to read from top to bottom,146
having this hyperlink above the enticing “Complete Purchase” button would put a reasonable
online consumer on constructive notice and therefore constitutes constructive knowledge of the
agreement’s terms prior to purchasing an item.147
These two suggestions not only consider the reasoning of the Specht court and the
psychological analysis of online consumers explored in this Comment, but also take into
consideration the statutory requirements of the FAA and the U.C.C. First, many of these
browse-wrap agreements contain arbitration provisions148 and therefore must comply with the
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FAA since this Act trumps all state laws regarding arbitration provisions.149 The
recommendations of this middle-ground approach do not (1) outright prohibit arbitration, (2)
require unequal treatment of arbitration provisions thus creating hostility towards them, or (3)
conflict with the FAA’s purpose. 150 Under these three circumstances, the Supreme Court has
found state laws regarding arbitration provisions unenforceable, but because the middle-ground
approaches of this Comment do not violate these three requirements, the FAA should not trump
state laws adopting these approaches.
The recommendations of this middle-ground approach also must comply with Article 2 of
the U.C.C since online retailers often sell movable goods. For online retailers to be sure that a
court does not find its hyperlinks containing the terms of a browse-wrap agreement
unenforceable under the U.C.C, these retailers may also want to make sure their hyperlinks are
conspicuous if the agreements themselves contain any disclaimers of warranty.151 Although the
U.C.C does not explicitly require this, online retailers should take the extra precaution.
“Conspicuous” has been defined as something “so written, displayed, or presented that a
reasonable person against which it is to operate ought to have noticed it;”152 however, this
definition still leaves ambiguity for individual courts to decide what exactly constitutes
conspicuousness in a particular situation.153 In order to be safe, online retailers ought to have the
hyperlinks to agreements containing disclaimers of warrant (regardless of the hyperlinks’
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placement on the retailers’ webpages), and not just the disclaimers found within the terms of the
agreements, underlined and in blue capital letters to indicate the presence of a hyperlink.154
VII.

Conclusion

The Second Circuit in Specht found that because no reasonable user of Netscape’s
website would scroll past an enticing “Download” button to find the hyperlink containing
Netscape’s browse-wrap agreement, the online downloader lacked constructive knowledge of the
agreement’s terms. As a result, the Second Circuit did not enforce the browse-wrap agreement,
including its arbitration provision. With both actual and constructive knowledge lacking, the
court held that the parties did not assent to the terms. Even under the FAA and its support by the
Supreme Court, arbitration provisions cannot be enforced without such assent. Psychological
studies regarding the predominance of impulse buys by online shoppers in recent years and new
technological advances that further entice such purchases support the conclusion that the Specht
court’s decision should be applied to all online retailer browse-wrap agreements. Due to the
analogous nature between the facts in Specht and an online shopper’s enticement to click on a
desired item to make a purchase without needing to scroll any further, states should adopt the
reasoning in Specht for all online retailers’ browse-wrap agreements as a rule of law. To avoid
courts finding a retailer’s browse-wrap agreement unenforceable due to a lack of constructive
knowledge of the agreement’s terms, this Comment recommends that online retailers either place
the hyperlink containing the browse-wrap agreement at the top of their webpages or above the
“Complete Purchase” button.
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Although this Comment makes suggestions for state legislatures and the highest courts of
the states to adopt when dealing with constructive knowledge of browse-wrap agreements, the
suggestions of this Comment are intended to apply only to online retailers.155 The suggestions in
this Comment, however, are not limited to online retailers’ browse-wrap agreements containing
arbitration provisions. Arbitration provisions have become increasingly popular over time and
most disagreements regarding the enforceability of browse-wrap agreements revolve around one
party not wanting to enforce an arbitration provision.156 As a result of the increased need for
guidance in this area of law, this Comment focuses on browse-wrap agreements containing
arbitration agreements in particular, but the analysis applies equally to online retailers’ browsewrap agreements not containing such provisions. By states adopting the suggestions of this
Comment when dealing with online retailers’ browse-wrap agreements, decisions within given
jurisdictions will yield consistent, uniform results.
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